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3 
Don't be so Negative: The Case for Positive Constitutional Voting 
Rights Post-Shelby County and Beyond 
INTRODUCTION 
Among the numerous rights that citizens of the United States ("US") possess, few hold as 
high a rank as the right to vote. President Ronald Reagan proclaimed that voting is the "crown 
jewel" of American liberties.1 President Lyndon Johnson exclaimed that voting "is the most 
powerful instrument ever devised by man for breaking down injustice. "2 The US Supreme Court 
has declared that voting "is the essence of a democratic society."3 Voting has been declared a 
fundamental right in the US because it is believed that the right to vote is preservative of all other 
rights.4 Stepping beyond the borders of the US, the right to vote has been declared a ''well-
established norm ofintemationallaw."5 
With such soaring rhetoric used to describe the right to vote in the US, many are 
surprised to learn that other countries throughout the world provide stronger constitutional 
protections for voting rights than the US Constitution does. 6 This fact is often surprising and at 
times disturbing to US citizens. This reality stems from the long held belief that the US 
Constitution does not confer upon its citizens positive or affirmative entitlements to government 
services, but rather "is a charter of negative liberties" restraining the government from action. 7 
The reasons for this approach to interpreting the Constitution have been debated and 
1 President Ronald Reagan, Remarks on Signing the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 (June 29, 1982). 
2 President Lyndon Johnson, Remarks on Signing the Voting Rights Act (August 6, 1965). 
3 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). 
4 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). 
5 Alexander Kirshner, The International Status of the Right to Vote, DEMOCRACY COALITION PROJECT, 
http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/lnternationai_Status_of_the_Right_to_Vote.pdf. 
6 Some have gone so far as to say that the US actually does not actually have a constitutional right to vote while 
others operate somewhere in the middle. Regardless of the position one takes, it is clear that the US Constitution 
does not provide an explicit right to vote. Rather the voting rights protected by the US Constitution have been 
developed through a series of amendments and also broad interpretations of these amendments. 
7 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law Principles and Policies, 565 (Vicky Been et at. eds., 4th ed. 2011); see also 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 195-196 (1989). 
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contemplated throughout history. But the purpose of this article is not to argue for an overall 
. approach to drafting a constitution, i.e. positive versus negative rights, but rather is to argue that 
regardless of the overall constitutional structure chosen by a country, the right to vote as a 
. singular right should be defined in a country's constitution as an affirmative, positive right. 
To show the necessity and benefits of defining the right to vote in such a manner, I have 
· chosen a comparative approach, selecting countries who define their right to vote negatively, 
statutorily and positively. Specifically, I have chosen four countries: the United States, India, 
Canada and South Africa. As a means of showing the distinctions between the different 
. approaches I focus on cases in which the right to vote was challenged as it relates to prisoners' 
voting rights.8 This selection was chosen with the premise that countries that protect prisoners' 
voting rights would have a strong constitutional right to vote and those who do not would have 
an equally less protective constitutional right to vote. The cases selected all involved a similar 
fact pattern: A prisoner or group of prisoners was deprived of their right to vote while in prison 
and as a result challenged the law disenfranchising them under their country's constitution and 
took the challenge to their country's highest court. 
Part I of this article briefly discusses the distinction between positive rights and negative 
rights. Part II will explore prisoners' voting rights in the US. Part III begins the comparative 
analysis and explores prisoners' voting rights in three other countries: India, Canada and South 
Africa. Part IV follows the comparative analysis and revisits the distinctions between positive 
and negative rights and asks: what difference does it make? Finally, Part V briefly discusses the 
8 One word of caution: this is not an article arguing for or against prisoner disenfranchisement- rather, these cases 
were selected as a lens through which one could view how strongly a country protects its right to vote and the 
correlation between the constitutional methods used to express the right. The benefit of using prisoners' voting 
rights cases is that the cases provide almost identical laws applied to identical fact patterns across numerous 
countries dealing with a similar right. The result is to see exactly how a country's highest court analyzes an 
infringement on the right to vote. 
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relevance of voting rights today and proposes that the right to vote is unique in a democracy and 
thus should be defined specifically in a constitution as an affirmative right regardless of the 
overall structure of a country's constitution. 
I. POSITIVE RIGHTS AND NEGATIVE RIGHTS DEFINED 
Put simply, positive rights require the government to do something and negative rights 
prevent the government from doing certain things. 9 If it is true that the US Constitution is a 
charter of negative liberties rather than positive rights, why was this choice made and what were 
the competing alternatives? Certainly the founding fathers had a reason for drafting the 
Constitution in such a manner and history shows that the choice was not made casually. Many 
reasons have been put forth explaining the choice. Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit 
explained the choice made by the founding fathers succinctly in the case of Jackson v. City of 
Joliet: 
The men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned that government might 
do too little for the people but that it might do too much to them. The Fourteenth 
Amendment, adopted in 1868 at the height of laissez-faire thinking, sought to 
protect Americans from oppression by state government, not to secure them basic 
governmental services. Of course, even in the laissez-faire era only anarchists 
thought the state should not provide the type of protective services at issue in this 
case. But no one thought federal constitutional guarantees or federal tort 
remedies necessary to prod the states to provide the services that everyone wanted 
provided.10 
This quote from Judge Posner explains that the reason the founding fathers chose a 
negative constitutional structure over the positive alternative was because the concern was never 
that the government would not provide necessary services but rather that the government would 
attempt to do too much. Although this approach certainly has merit it also can have 
unanticipated consequences. As Jackson will later show and also the cases involving prisoners' 
9 Susan Bandesna, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH.l. REV. 2271, 2279 (1990). 
10 Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983). 
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voting rights, the structure that was thought to protect citizens from government can also at times 
be harmful. It can be used by the government to take away citizens' rights and also allow the 
government to claim no obligation to engage in certain activities. 
II. TAKING AWAY A FELON'S RIGHT To VOTE IN THE UNITED STATES 
Under the US Constitution, states may disenfranchise both felons and ex-felons. 11 
Although the US Supreme Court has declared that inmates who are awaiting trial must be 
provided with either an absentee ballot or other alternatives to voting, this does nothing for the 
inmate who has been convicted. 12 With the understanding that the US historically has been a 
very pro-democracy and pro-voting country it is important to understand the legal analysis that 
the US Supreme Court engages in when they determine that the US Constitution does not 
guarantee a person's right to vote when they have been convicted of a felony. 
a. McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners 
In McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, the Supreme Court held that the State 
of Illinois's absentee voting statutes, which provided that absentee ballots be provided to those 
medically unable to go to the polls, did not deny equal protection to those who were charged 
with an offense and held awaiting trial. 13 In McDonald, a group of un-sentenced inmates 
brought suit against the State of Illinois challenging a law that allowed absentee ballots only for 
those who had a disability or would be outside their county of residence on Election Day. 14 The 
practical effect of the law prevented inmates who were awaiting trial form being able to vote. 15 
The inmates argued that since fundamental voting rights were involved there should be a 
lesser presumption in favor of upholding the law than would normally accompany a challenge to 
11 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974). 
12 O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 531 (1974); see also Chemerinskey, supra note 7, at 901. 
13 McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802,810-811 (1969) 
14 McDonald, 394 U.S. at 803-804. 
15 /d. at 803. 
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state legislation. 16 In upholding the law the Court explained that the states have long been held 
to have wide latitude in detennining how voting is exercised.17 The Court then decided what 
standard of review was:required for examining the state law}8 Although it appeared at first that 
the Court would apply: strict scrutiny, the Court explained that despite the traditional habit of 
more exacting scrutiny for laws aimed at restraining the right to vote, such exacting scrutiny was 
unnecessary for two reasons. 19 The Court found that because the distinctions made under the law 
were not made on wealth or race, strict scrutiny was not required.20 Surprisingly, the Court also 
held that the law did not act to deny the right to vote but rather, denied an absentee ballot.21 
Based upon these two conclusions the Court held that strict scrutiny was unnecessary and 
instead applied "the more traditional standards for evaluating . . . equal protection claims" or 
rational basis review.22 Thus, the laws would "be set aside only if no grounds c[ould] be 
conceived to justify them."23 The Court stated that there was nothing to show that the pretrial 
inmates were entirely prohibited from voting. 24 "Constitutional safeguards are not thereby 
offended simply because some prisoners ... find voting more convenient than" those prisoners 
challenging the law. 25 
b. O'Brien v. Skinner 
In Obrien v. Skinner, another group of inmates challenged a New York state law that 
prohibited voting for those who were confined either awaiting trial or being held pursuant to a 
16 ld. at 806. 
17 I d. at 807. 
18/d. 
19/d. 
20 McDonald, 394 U.S. at 808. 
21/d. 
22/d. 
23 ld. at 809. 
24/d. 
25 /d. at 810. 
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misdemeanor conviction.26 The inmates who challenged the law had attempted to "establish a 
mobile voters' registration unit in the county jail in compliance with a mobile registration 
procedure which had been employed in some county jails in New York State."27 The inmates 
request was denied and as a result they requested to be transported to a polling place or else 
provided absentee ballots.28 These requests were also denied.29 In denying the requests, the 
election authorities stated that they were under no obligation to enable the inmates to vote and 
that the inmates did not qualify for absentee ballots under the state law.30 
In analyzing the inmates' requests, the Supreme Court first noted that other than being 
physically unable to get to the polling locations, the inmates were not disqualified from voting in 
any other way.31 The Court further noted that the law in question had a paradoxical effect where 
an inmate who was incarcerated in a county other than the one of their primary residency could 
apply for and receive an absentee ballot. 32 These inmates were deemed unavoidably absent from 
their county and thus qualified for an absentee ballot. 33 On the other hand, inmates who were 
confined in their county of primary residency were denied absentee ballots because they were 
considered present for the purposes of voting and thus did not qualify for absentee ballots. 34 
The Court held that the law was not constitutional because it discriminated between 
categories of qualified voters in wholly arbitrary ways. 35 The Court distinguished McDonald, 
explaining that in McDonald, the record did not show that inmates were absolutely barred from 
26 O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 525 (1974). 
27 O'Brien, 414 U.S. at 525. 
28 ld. at 525. 
29 /d. at 527. 
30 I d. at 527. 
31 /d. at 528. 
32 ld. at 528-529. 
33 O'Brien, 414 U.S. at 529. 
34/d. 
35 ld. at 530. 
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voting and the Court's holding rested on essentially a lack ofproof.36 By contrast, the inmates in 
0 'Brien were a category that was entirely precluded from voting and there was no failure of 
proof- the inmates were able to show that if they were imprisoned in their county of residency 
awaiting trial or serving a misdemeanor sentence they wouid not be accommodated at all. 37 As a 
result of the complete bar to voting for this class of inma~es, the Court struck down the law as 
violating equal protection38 
Taken together, McDonald and 0 'Brien appear to: stand for the proposition that states 
may not entirely prohibit non-felons from voting while awaiting trial or serving misdemeanor 
sentences. 39 This will often be a matter of proof. As McDonald shows, sometimes the practical 
effect of a law will not be deemed to equate to a complete bar and the law could be upheld. 
States do not necessarily have to provide absentee ballots, but where they refuse, an alternative 
means of voting must be supplied.40 However, these minimal safeguards do not apply at all to 
convicted felons. 
c. Richardson v. Ramirez 
In Richardson v. Ramirez the Supreme Court held that denying convicted felons the right 
to vote does not violate equal protection in the US. In Richardson, three felons who had served 
their sentence and were no longer in prison "filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Supreme 
Court of California to compel California county election officials to register them as voters."41 
The statute disenfranchised all "persons convicted of an 'infamous crime. "'42 The three 
individuals argued that the California statute in question "denied them the right to equal 
36 /d. at 529. 
37 ld. at 530. 
38 /d. at 531. 
39 Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 901. 
40 See McDonald, 394 U.S. at 810-811; O'Brien, 414 U.S. at 530-531. 
41 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24,55-56 (1974). 
42 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 26. 
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protection of the laws under the Federal Constitution."43 Specifically, they argued (1) that the 
state was required to show a compelling interest to disenfranchise the felons and this could no 
longer be shown in regard to ex-felons and (2) that because there was such a lack of uniformity 
in the~application of such laws throughout California, there was a denial of due process.44 The 
California Supreme Court held that the statute was a denial of equal protection under the 
Constitution "as applied to all ex-felons whose terms of incarceration and parole have expired" 
and never reached the question of due process. 45 
On review of the California decision, the Supreme Court noted that the argument that was 
being made by the state relied upon Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment which discussed the 
denial of voting to persons who participated "in rebellion, or other crime[s].',46 Justice 
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, recounted the minimal legislative history that was available 
regarding Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.47 Despite being limited, the majority found 
the language of Section 2 combined with the history that was available regarding the drafting of 
the relevant section to be highly persuasive in finding that a state could, in compliance with the 
mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment, deny ex-felons the right to vote.48 
The court concluded "that the understanding of those who adopted the Fourteenth 
Amendment ... and [] the historical and judicial interpretation of the Amendment's applicability 
to state laws disenfranchising felons, [was] of controlling significance in distinguishing such 
laws from those other limitations on the franchise which have been held invalid under the Equal 
43 /d. at 27. 
44 /d. at 33. 
45 ld. at 33-34. 
46 ld. at 41-42. 
47 ld. at 43-55. 
48 Rich~rdson, 418 U.S. at 54-55. 
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Protection Clause.',49 The Court ultimately held that based upon the language of Section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment the Supreme Court of California erred in holding that the state could n;ot 
deny ex-felons the right to vote. 5° 
It is noteworthy that in the opinion, Justice Rehnquist never discusses the standard ?f 
review. Rather, without ever getting into strict scrutiny analysis, which would seem to be t~e 
appropriate standard for reviewing the denial of a fundamental right, the majority relies solely 
upon the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment to find that a state can deny, even e~­
felons, the right to vote. 51 This is important for two reasons. First, in a discussion of the debate 
between positive rights and negative rights, one of the key factors regarding negative rights is the 
other safeguards in place when a fundamental right is defined negatively in the Constitution. For 
example, one may argue that in the US, positive rights are unnecessary because in the US, courts 
review the denial of a fundamental right under strict scrutiny, which has been said to be "strict ·m 
theory, fatal in fact."52 This exacting standard of scrutiny would seem to be sufficient for 
protecting fundamental rights. However, Richardson highlights the problem with negative rights 
and the standard of review approach to dealing with the abridgment of fundamental rights. 
Having a right defined negatively, implies that there are limits, which makes it much 
easier for courts to justify taking away the right. Furthermore, as Richardson reveals, if the 
Supreme Court is willing to so easily sidestep the appropriate standard of review in dealing with 
fundamental rights, then tiered review is no protection at all and makes negative rights all the 
more susceptible to abridgment. If strict scrutiny is truly going to protect negative rights then it 
must be consistently employed and not casually sidestepped. If one accepts that negative rights 
49 /d. at 54. 
50 /d. at 56. 
51 /d. at 43-56. 
52 Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact, 59 VAND. L REV. 798-799 (2006). 
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do come with inherent flaws regarding the right to vote, the next logical question then becomes 
what is the best alternative. There are two logical alternatives which are discussed in tum: (1) 
defining the right statutorily or (2) as a positive, affirmative right. 
Ill. PRISONER DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
In debating the alternatives to negative rights for defining the right to vote in a 
constitution, the two other most commonly discussed alternatives are a statutory right and a 
positive or affirmative right. While both have their unique strengths and weaknesses generally 
speaking, every country may find their own justifications for choosing one form over the other. 
This next section looks at the right to vote in India which is provided by statute and then looks at 
two countries that provide the right to vote, along with the bulk of their other rights positively -
Canada and South Africa. 
a. India and the Right to Vote 
The primary structure of India's Constitution is positive in nature. 53 It confers a variety 
of rights upon its citizens including the positive right to free speech and expression, peaceable 
assembly, freedom of movement, and free education to children from the age of six to fourteen.54 
Despite conferring such a wide variety of affirmative rights upon its citizens, India's Constitution 
is silent regarding the right to vote. 55 The reason for this is because the right to vote in India 
"has been held to be a statutory right and not a common law right" and is conferred only by 
statute. 56 "It is pure and simple a statutory right."57 
53 See INDIA CONST., Jan. 26, 1950, Part III-IV, art. 14-51. 
54 ld. at Part Ill, art. 19-22, 29-31. 
55 See INDIA CONST., Jan. 26, 1950. 
56 Pradhan v. Union of India & Ors, (1997) S.C.R., at 4 (India). 
57 /d. 
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In Pradhan v. Union Of India & Ors, the relevant law prevented a person from voti.ng in 
any election if he or she was confined in a prison or otherwise in legal custody of the police. 58 
Because India's Constitution is silent on the right to vote, the law was challenged as violating 
Articles 14 and 21 of the Indian Constitution.59 Articles 14 and 21 provide to Indian Citizens the 
right to equality and due process respectively. 60 The Court stated that ''the challenge to the 
constitutional validity of[the law was] based primarily on Article 14" and rejected the Article 21 
due process claim.61 
In challenging the law, the petitioner prisoners argued specifically that the law that 
denied the right to vote to people in police custody was significantly over broad because it 
denied people the right to vote who were being detained for any reason whatsoever no matter 
how trivial the offense.62 In reviewing the petitioner's challenge to the law the Court employed 
its standard of review for a denial of any right under Article 14. In India, a reasonable 
classification is permitted when it "has a rational nexus with the object of classification."63 The 
Court's analysis primarily focused on whether or not the classification was reasonable.64 
The Court said that the aim of the laws that prevented persons with criminal backgrounds 
from voting was to prevent the criminalization of politics and to maintain the integrity of 
elections. 65 The Court accepted these objectives and opined that these goals must be welcomed 
and upheld as furthering the asserted purpose. 66 After the Court acknowledged that the purpose 
had a rational nexus with the object of the classification, the Court explained that the amount of 
58 /d. at 1-2. 
59 /d. at 2. 
60 INDIA CONST., Jan. 26, 1950, Part III-IV, art. 14 and 21. 
61 Pradhan, (1997} S.C.R., at 4-5 (India). 
62 /d. at 3. 
63 ld. at 2-3. 
64 /d. at 4-5 
65 /d. 
66 Pradhan, (1997) S.C.R., at 3 (India). 
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discretion available to the legislature in instituting a classification depends upon the context in 
which the enactment exists.67 The Court said that the criminalization of politics was ''the bane of 
society and negation of democracy."68 The Court found that the law so far ~hould be upheld as 
rationally connected to its aims and that it was enacted in an appropriate context. 
Finally, and most importantly, the Court discussed the history ofvoti~g rights in India.69 
"[T]he nature of the right to vote has been held to be a statutory right and ·not a common law 
right."70 Based upon prior cases it is clear that voting rights in India are "a creature of statute or 
special law and must be subject to the limitations imposed by it."71 Furthermore, the Court 
entirely rejected the notion that the Fundamental Rights Articles of the Indian Constitution had 
any relevance on a right created by statute. 72 Voting in India "is a special right and can only be 
exercised on the conditions laid down by the statute [and the] Fundamental Rights [Articles 
have] no bearing on a right like this created by statute."73 The Court concluded: 
In view of the settled law on the point, it must be held that the right to vote is 
subject to the limitation imposed by the statute which can be exercised only in the 
manner provided by the statute; and that the challenge to any provision of the 
statue prescribing the nature of the right to elect cannot be made with reference to 
a fundamental right in the Constitution. The very basis of [the] challenge to the 
validity of [the law] is, therefore, not available and this petition must fail. 
Consequently, this petition is dismissed.74 
Based upon the fact that the fatal flaw to this challenge in India was the fact that the right 
to vote was nowhere contained in the Constitution and thus not subject to constitutional 
safeguards, it is clear that a country who wants to protect its citizens' right to vote should not 
67 /d. 
68/d. 
69 /d. at 4. 
70 /d. 
71/d. 
72 Pradhan, {1997) S.C.R., at 4-5 (India). 
73 /d. at 5. 
74 /d. at 5. 
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prefer conferring the right statutorily through the legislative process. Although some may argue 
that other countries may protect a statutory right to vote more than the Supreme Court of India 
did, with the history of legislative deference throughout the world, and most certainly in the 
United States, there is no justification for gambling on such an important right by leaving it to a 
legislature. The result that is almost certain to follow is that when a legislature confers a right, a 
legislature may take it away and the courts will not intervene. 
b. Canada and the Right to Vote 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is primarily a constitution of positive 
rights.75 For example, the Charter outlines in detail a list of"Fundamental Freedoms" including 
freedom of conscience and religion, thought, belief, opinion, expression, freedom of the press, 
peaceable assembly and association.76 In addition to these fundamental rights, Canadians are 
also entitled to a substantial number of other rights also defined affirmatively such as language 
rights, educational rights, equality rights and legal rights. 77 The right to vote in Canada can be 
found in the Canadian Charter under "Democratic Rights."78 
Concerning the right to vote in Canada, the Charter states that "[ e ]very citizen of Canada 
has the right to vote in an election of members of the House of Commons or of a legislative 
assembly and to be qualified for membership therein."79 "The Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. "80 This is 
75 See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.). 
76 /d. at Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 2 (U.K.). 
n /d. at c. 16-23 (U.K.). 
78 /d. at c. 3 (U.K.). 
79/d. 
80 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 being Schedule B to the Canada 
Act, 1982 c. 3-5 (U.K.) (emphasis added). 
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the only standard of review available for courts to employ in Can.ada in evaluating an 
infringement of a right. Thus, anytime there is an attempt to infringe upon the rights contained 
in the Charter, the government will have a heavy burden to overcome. 
In Sauve v. Canada, the task of overcoming this burden was highlighted when a law that 
denied the right to vote to "[ e ]very person who is imprisoned in a correctional institution serving 
a sentence of two years or more" was challenged by Richard Sauve. 81 The law was passed 
following a prior Canadian Supreme Court ruling that struck down a similar law that denied the 
right to every person imprisoned in a correctional institution regardless of the length of the 
sentence. 82 
In analyzing the law, Chief Justice McLachlin began by emphasizing the importance of 
voting rights in Canada. "The right of every citizen to vote, guaranteed by . . . the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, lies at the heart of Canadian democracy."83 The Canadian 
Supreme Court engaged in a twofold analysis. The Court asked ( 1) whether the challenged law 
infringed upon a right of the citizens and (2) if it did infringe upon a right, whether the 
infringement could be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 84 If it could not 
be justified the law would be struck down and if it could, the law would be sustained. In 
determining whether or not the law can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society the court asks whether the infringing law "achieves a constitutionally valid purpose or 
objective, and [whether] the chosen means are reasonable and demonstrably justified."85 
This two-part inquiry - the legitimacy of the objective and the proportionality of 
the means - ensures that a reviewing court examine rigorously all aspects of 
justification. Throughout the justification process, the government bears the 
81 Sauve v. Canada, 3 [2002] S.C.R. 519, para. 3-7. 
82 Sauve v. Canada, 7 O.R. (3d) (C.A.) aka "Sauve No. I" 
83 Sauve, 3 S.C.R. at 519, para. 9. 
84 /d. at 519, para. 7. 
as /d. 
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burden of proving a valid objective and showing that the rights violation is 
warranted - that is, that it is rationaiiy connected, causes minimal impairment, 
and is proportionate to the benefit achieved. 86 
For the purposes of the argument, the Government conceded that the law infringed upon 
the guaranteed right of ail citizens to vote. 87 Thus, the Court focused their entire analysis on 
whether or not the law was rational and could be justified. 88 The Court defined and explained 
the right to vote in Canada. 89 It is important to note the significance the Court placed on the 
language used in the Canadian Charter to define the right to vote. For example, in explaining the 
paramount importance of individual voting rights in Canada, the Court explained that the framers 
of the Charter indicated the unique importance of voting by using broad, untrammeled 
/anguage.90 The Court explained that because the right was defined so clearly there could be no 
presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a law proscribing the right. 91 "This Court has 
repeatedly held that the 'general claim that the infringement of a right is justified ... does not 
warrant deference to Parliament ... rather, it requires the state to justify such limitations."92 
The government argued that denying inmates the right to vote was simply a matter of 
social and political philosophy and thus it was fully appropriate for the legislature to enact laws 
that reflected the majority opinion on the issue.93 In addition to declining to show any deference 
to the legislature on the issue, the Court also proclaimed that the rights contained in the Canadian 
Charter "are not a matter of privilege or merit, but a function of membership in the Canadian 
polity that cannot be lightly cast aside."94 "It is for the courts, unaffected by the shifting winds 
86/d. 
87 /d. at 519, para. 6. 
88/d. 
89 Sauve, 3 S.C.R. at 519, para. 9-11. 
90 ld. at 519, para. 11 (emphasis added). 
91 /d. at 519, para. 12. 
92/d. 
93/d. 
94/d. 
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of public opinion and electoral interests, to safeguard the right to vote."95 After outlining the 
principles of judicial review of fundamental rights under the Charter, the Court concluded ''that 
the government's stated objectives of promoting civic responsibility, respect for the law and 
imposing appropriate punishment, while problematically vague, [were] capable in principle of 
justifying limitations on Charter rights."96 Despite accepting the government's stated objectives 
as legitimate, the Court then held that the government failed to establish proportionality of the 
law because there was a lack of a rational connection between denying inmates the right to vote 
and the identified goals.97 
Under Canada's proportionality and rationality analysis, the government is required to 
show the denial of a right will further the objectives put forth.98 The denial of the right cannot be 
denied any further than is necessary and the benefits of denying the right must outweigh the 
negative impacts. 99 The first question the court asked under the proportionality review was 
whether denying inmates the right to vote increased respect for the law. 100 The government 
advanced three theories on this point: ( 1) taking away the right to vote sent an educative message 
about the importance of the right to vote, (2) allowing inmates to vote was demeaning to the 
political system, and (3) that this was a legitimate and reasonable punishment for committing a 
crime. 101 
The Court in turn rejected all three of the government's theories. First, the Court replied, 
this "message is more likely to harm than to help respect for the law."102 Second, the idea that 
95 Sauve, 3 S.C.R. at 519, para. 12. 
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allowing those who disobey the law to vote would demean the political system is an ancient and 
obsolete belief.103 "Denial ;of the right to vote on the basis of attributed moral unworthiness is 
inconsistent with the respect for the dignity of every person that lies at the heart of Canadian 
democracy and the Charter~" 104 Finally, the Court rejected the government's third argument. 
The Court stated, that whe~ the government's final argument was stripped of all its rhetoric it 
amounted to a new tool in the arsenal of punishments - denial of constitutional rights. 105 The 
Court then convincingly explained that accepting this argument from the government would be 
tantamount to accepting the argument that prisoners are not protected by the Canadian Charter. 106 
The government certainly could not pass a law denying the right of prisoners to be free from 
cruel and unusual punishment, the freedom of religion, or freedom of expression. 107 The Court 
then asked rhetorically why the right to vote was any different. 108 The Court concluded by 
holding that the law could not be justified in a free and democratic society. 109 
Although the Court's analysis was certainly exhaustive and thorough in Sauve, it is 
important to take special note of the role that positive rights played in the Court's analysis. One 
of the government's arguments rejected by the Court was that the law helped create a sense of 
"civic responsibility."1 10 In support of this argument, the government attempted to justify the 
law by analogizing the law with laws that prevented youth from voting. 111 The Court replied that 
this analogy was inaccurate because in the instance of youth voting rights, the government is not 
saying that the class who is denied the right is unworthy of voting, but rather they are making a 
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decision based on the life experience of the citizen. 112 In the case of prisoners' voting rights 
being denied, there is a moral judgment being made which cannot be tolerated under the 
Charter. 113 The Court pronounced that this was not the lawmakers' decision to make.114 "The 
Charter makes this decision for us by guaranteeing the right of 'every citizen' to vote and by 
expressly placing prisoners under the protective umbrella of the Charter through constitutional 
limits on punishment."115 Thus, the prisoners are protected just like any other citizen, "and short 
of a constitutional amendment, lawmakers cannot change this." 116 
It is clear that in Canada not only is the source of the right (i.e. a constitution versus a 
statutory right) extremely important, but also the language used to express it. Thus it is clear that 
in at least one country, defining the right to vote in a specific, affirmative manner affords more 
protection to the individual citizen than a statutory or negative constitutional right, even if that 
citizen is a felon or ex-felon. 
c. South Africa and the Right to Vote 
The South African Constitution has been widely regarded as the model of a positive 
rights constitution. It certainly contains a long list of affirmative rights including some rights 
that stand out as unique in comparison to other constitutions.117 For example, the South African 
Constitution, in addition to providing traditional rights such as freedom of religion, expression, 
belief and association, also provides for the rights of trade, occupation, profession, healthcare, 
food, water and access to government information.1 18 The political rights that are possessed by 
South African citizens are also substantial. In South Africa, "Every adult citizen has the right to 
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vote in elections for any legislative body established in tenns of the Constitution, and to do so in 
secret."119 South Africa's Constitution provides that voting and a national common voters' roll 
is one of the foremost values on which the country was founded. 120 This language makes clear 
that voting rights in South Africa are considered to be of the u~ost importance. 
In August and Another v. Electoral Commission and Ot_hers, the Court dealt specifically 
with a law denying prisoners' their voting rights. 121 The relevant law denied the right t<? vote to 
all prisoners who were convicted of a crime that resulted in: detention in prison without the 
option for a fine and also from any prisoner who committed murder, robbery, and rape or 
attempted any of these crimes. 122 
Two prisoners, one serving a sentence for fraud and the other un-sentenced awaiting trial 
also on fraud charges, "sought an undertaking from the [Election] Commission that [they] would 
be able to take part in the elections."123 The Commission responded by stating that they would 
not oppose the application of the voters to vote in any election and in fact would take measures 
to enable the prisoners to vote. 124 The decision of the Commission was then challenged in court 
and the Transvaal High Court delivered an opinion explaining that the Commission should not 
undertake the efforts to enable the prisoners to vote.125 The Transvaal Court relied upon what 
they referred to as the "insunnountable logistical, financial and administrative difficulties" in 
striking down the prisoners' request for voting accommodations. 126 The Court further reasoned 
that because the prisoners' logistical difficulties in voting were of their own making, special 
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accommodations enabling them to vote were unnecessary. 127 "[S]pecial measures to 
accommo~ate voters should be reserved for those voters 'whose predicament was not of their 
own maki~g. '"128 
Th~ prisoners then appealed the decision of the Transvaal Court to the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa.129 The prisoners' sought "an order declaring that they and all prisoners 
[were] entitled to register as voters on the national common voters' roll and to vote in the 
forthcoming general elections, and requiring the respondents to make all necessary arrangements 
to enable them and all prisoners to do so."130 Interestingly, the prisoners argued that not only did 
the South .African Constitution require that they be allowed to vote; they also argued that the 
Election Commission was affirmatively obligated ''to create conditions enabling them to vote ... 
and make the necessary arrangements for these rights to be realized."131 
The Constitutional Court noted in their opinion that the right to vote, by design, imposes 
upon the legislature and the executive affirmative obligations. 132 For example, election dates 
must be set, secret ballots and machinery must be established, and officials must manage the 
elections on Election Day.133 The Court said that in addition to these affirmative obligations, the 
right to vote in South Africa certainly imposes on the Election Commission, which was created 
to carry-out these affirmative duties, the responsibility "to take reasonable steps to ensure that 
eligible voters are registered." 134 The Court then transitioned from explaining the requirements 
imposed on the Commission to recounting the significance of voting rights in South Africa. 135 
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"Universal adult suffrage on a common voters roll is one of the foundational values of 
our entire constitutional order."136 The Court stated that voting rights were essential to acquiring 
rights and for effective citizenship. 137 Furthermore, the Court explained that voting rights say 
that everybody counts and are also a badge of dignity. 138 "In a country of great disparities of 
wealth and power it declares that whoever we are, whether rich or poor, exalted or disgraced, we _ 
all belong to the same democratic South African nation; that our destinies are intertwined in a 
single interactive polity."139 
In reviewing the Court's opinion in August, it is important to note the complete lack of 
deference to the legislature. The Court went out if its way to note that when dealing with the 
right to vote, "the franchise must be interpreted in favor of enfranchisement rather than 
disenfranchisement."140 The Court also contrasted the right to vote with other rights that are 
inherently restricted by incarceration. 141 For example, the Court said that prisoners "no longer 
have freedom of movement and have no choice regarding the place of imprisonment." In 
addition, "contact with the outside world is limited" and prisoners "must submit to the discipline 
of prison life and to the rules and regulations which prescribe how they must conduct themselves 
and how they are to be treated while in prison."142 So it is clear that the Court in South Africa 
acknowledges and accepts that there is a denial of important rights by the very fact of one's 
incarceration however, this will not justify a complete denial of all constitutional rights in South 
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Africa. ''Nevertheless, there is a substantial residue of basic rights which [prisoners] may not be 
denied; and if they are denied them, then they are entitled to legal redress."143 
The Court acknowledged that "the idea that murderers, rapists and armed robbers should 
be entitled to vote will offend many people": however "the task of this Court is to ensure that 
fundamental rights and democratic processes are protected."144 The Court concluded by leaving 
open the possibility that the right to vote could potentially be taken away from certain categories 
of criminals however, to do so the law must be drawn very narrowly and only strike at a very 
specific class of criminals and the law must also serve a legitimate purpose.145 
IV. CONCLUSION: POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE RIGHTS-WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE? 
It is clear that the language used to express citizens' voting rights is important and does 
make a difference when the right is challenged. The right of citizens to participate in the 
political processes of their respective country can be established by a variety of methods, means, 
and language. The purpose of this article is to show that these choices matter, and once the 
choice is made it is often hard to correct any flaws or weaknesses that are later realized in the 
choice. 
Returning to Jackson, seventeen year old Jerry Ross and sixteen year old Sandra Jackson, 
who was six months pregnant, were involved in a serious car accident.146 A City of Joliet police 
officer arrived at the scene of the accident and made no attempts to determine whether anyone 
was in the car or rescue either of the passengers. 147 Rather, as the car began to burn, the police 
officer called the fire department and directed traffic around the scene of the accident. 148 The 
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fire department arrived, put out the fire and only then realized that Ross and Jackson were still in 
the car.149 Jackson was taken to the hospital where she was pronounced dead along with her 
fetus while Ross was left in the vehicle. 150 He was later removed by a tow-truck driver and 
pronounced dead. 151 
The families of Ross and Jackson sued the City of Joliet, alleging that they could have 
been saved if the police officer had aided Ross and Jackson, or at least called an ambulance 
immediately.152 Judge Posner suggested that if there was a claim to be brought it was ''under the 
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause."153 Judge Posner explained there were two 
possible theories under the Fourteenth Amendment by which a claim could be brought: (1) that 
the deceased were entitled to some level of positive rights under the Constitution or (2) that the 
negligent acts of the personnel of the City of Joliet constituted a deprivation of life without due 
process of law. 154 
Judge Posner rejected both possibilities.155 Specifically, in regard to the first argument, 
Judge Posner dismissed it simply by stating ''that the Constitution is a charter of negative rather 
than positive liberties."156 "It is enough to note that, as currently understood, the concept of 
liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment does not include a right to basic services, whether 
competently provided or otherwise."157 Judge Posner rejected the due process claim explaining 
that only an intentional tort would suffice to successfully bring the claim. 158 
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This case, combined with the voting rights cases from the US, Canada and South Africa 
illustrates the impact that a positive right can have as opposed to a negative right. There are 
strong arguments against positive rights and in favor of the negative rights approach. Two 
arguments that are common in opposing positive rights are (1) the "floodgates" argument and (2) 
the "slippery slope" argument. 159 
The floodgates theory suggests that if cases such as Jackson are successfully brought, 
many others will arise. 16° Courts then will be engaged in the . process of evaluating and 
determining how governments should do their jobs.161 However, in opposing this argument, one 
can look to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. If positive rights are allowed, doctrines such as 
sovereign immunity would still survive and the courts would be focused on whether the branches 
of government are "transgressing the rights of individuals." 
Furthermore, the floodgates theory has little place in the discussion of voting rights. This 
is for two reasons. First, elections in the US already place affirmative obligations on government 
entities. As the South African Supreme Court explained in rejecting the attempts to 
disenfranchise prisoners in August, election dates must be set, secret ballots and machinery must 
be established, and officials must manage the elections on Election Day. 162 This occurs in the 
US as well. Except for the fact that based on current interpretations of voting rights in the US, 
the government is not required to do these things, it is clear that the US is very capable of 
handling elections in the US. Second, the right to vote is a fundamental right. It seems that 
where a right is fundamental it would be reasonable to expect a increased burden on the 
government to see that the right is not only protected from abridgment but also realized by the 
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citizens. So while the floodgates argument may hold weight in a discussion of the best overall 
structure for a constitution it is less persuasive when it comes to the discussion of voting rights. 
The "Slippery Slope" argument posits that once a constitution allows the "government to 
do anything but leave [citizens] alone, [they] will end with it coercing [them] to obey its idea of 
freedom." 163 "In the constitutional realm, the argument is that once [it is held] that due process 
requires the government to perform a statutorily mandated duty to protect a known individual 
from threatened harm, [citizens] will next be forcing cities to create police and fire departments 
and will ultimately be guaranteeing every person a living wage and enough to eat." 164 Again, 
just as the floodgates argument, this argument has merit regarding the overall structure of a 
constitution. The argument carries less weight however when discussing a single fundamental 
right, such as voting. By requiring the government to facilitate voting, by affirmative 
obligations, citizens are guaranteed that the government will always have to provide the one right 
that operates as a check on its power: voting. This can prevent the "parade of horribles" that 
those who argue against positive rights, claim will follow if positive rights are realized. 
Although there are other arguments against positive constitutional rights, these two 
arguments provide an accurate portrayal of the essence of most of arguments. They all tend to 
focus on the issue of the logical stopping point when a constitution does provide positive rights. 
The major flaw in this argument is that it proceeds as if positive constitutional rights are an all or 
nothing proposition. The reality is that it is possible to provide some rights affirmatively and 
others negatively. Furthermore, some rights, such as the right to vote, are so essential to a 
democracy that they should hold a unique position within a constitution, meaning that even if the 
overall structure of the constitution is negative, the right to vote should still always be a positive 
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right. Accordingly, arguments that create the impression that positive rights will lead to 
unsustainable government obligations should be accorded less weight in regards to the right to 
vote. 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL VOTING RIGHTS TODAY AND RECOMMENDATIONS GOING FORWARD 
a. Domestically 
The US Supreme Court recently struck down the core of the landmark 1965 Voting 
Rights Act (the Act), legislation that was aimed at stopping "an insidious and pervasive evil 
which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious 
defiance of the Constitution." 165 In striking down the most significant parts of the Act, the Court 
noted that while voting discrimination still exists, the conditions which justified the Act in 1965 
no longer exist today.166 The Court also stated that the Act "imposes substantial federalism costs 
and differentiates between the States, despite our historic tradition that all states enjoy equal 
sovereignty."167 The Court concluded the opinion by opining that their decision "in no way 
affects . the permanent, nationwide ban on racial discrimination in voting" however the 
protections created by the 1965 Voting Rights Act's coverage formula could no longer be 
justified.168 
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Shelby County, it is essential to look at 
the safeguards that are in place to protect a citizen's right to vote in the US. One ofthe likely 
results of Shelby County is that there will be many more attempts to disenfranchise voters in the 
US. There already have been noteworthy attempts by states to interfere with the voting rights of 
Americans by passing laws requiring voter identification and other requirements, under the guise 
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of preventing fraud in elections.169 However, many of these laws are aimed more at voter 
suppression rather than the prevention of fraud in elections. 
Although the full force of the Supreme Court's decision in Shelby County has yet to be 
realized, it is clear that the decision, at a minimum will give states more leeway in handling 
elections. In the US, states have always had "broad powers to determine the conditions under 
which the right of suffrage may be exercised."170 Prior to Shelby County, the Supreme Court 
upheld voter identification laws in lndiana171 and in Arizona.172 Other attempts have also been 
made to do the same in states such as Pennsylvania, Florida and South Carolina. 173 While the 
laws in Pennsylvania, Florida and South Carolina were never successfully implemented, they 
were all introduced prior to the Shelby County decision and thus it stands to be seen whether 
renewed attempts would be successful. It seems under the Court's renewed embrace of 
federalism over individual voting rights, deference to these laws will once again become a hurdle 
for those whose rights are threatened by state election laws. 
With such sly attempts to interfere with voting rights, it is essential that Americans 
always stay alert to attempts to disenfranchise some classes of voters and also the constitutional 
protections afforded those who are potentially affected. Although voting is a fundamental right 
in the US, it is clear that the US Constitution is not as protective of voting rights as some other 
constitutions throughout the world. Realistically, an amendment in the US declaring voting to be 
a positive right is unlikely. However, it is still a worthy endeavor to explore the positive 
alternative to the negative right as a means of understanding the strengths and weaknesses of 
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both so that one is well equipped to engage in the legal battles that can protect citizens' voting 
rights. 
b. Internationally 
Much can be gained by evaluating the constitutional protections afforded a citizen via 
their respective constitution. The relevance today internationally is that countries in their 
constitutional infancy should reevaluate the status of the right to vote under their constitution. 
Where it is believed necessary to strengthen the right to vote, attempts to amend the constitution 
should be made sooner than later. The longer a country waits to amend a constitution, the more 
challenging the already onerous process is. In addition, countries that have yet to formulate their 
constitution ·would be well advised to provide for strong constitutional protections for the right to 
vote. Countries such as Egypt, who may very well be in the midst of a constitutional moment, 
would be well advised to adopt .strong protections for voting rights because they are preservative 
of other fundamental rights and also are an effective check on govemment. 174 
In looking at the choices that a country has when making a decision regarding a 
constitution and the right to vote the three most important choices that must be made are (1) 
whether to confer the right primarily by a constitution or statutorily; (2) once the first choice has 
been made whether to opt for a positive right or negative right, and finally (3) whether to utilize 
specific or generalized language in articulating the right. 
c. Constitutional Rights or Statutory Rights? 
Pradhan, clearly reveals the dangers that arise when a country chooses to confer 
important rights via the legislative process as opposed to a constitution. Although many argue 
that this is a more efficient way of handling the conferring of rights, the case demonstrates how 
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little deference is given to the citizens claims and how much deference is given to the legislature. 
When dealing with statutory rights in India, all that is needed for the government to take away 
the right from a citizen is a classification that has a rational nexus with the object of the 
classification. This highly deferential standard is an analogue to rational basis review in the US. 
Thus, as was highlighted by Pra(jhan, citizens should not get too comfortable with their statutory 
rights because those rights which are provided by a legislature can just as easily be taken away 
by a legislature. 
In contrast to statutory rights are constitutional rights, which were the subject of the cases 
discussed in the US, Canada and South Africa. It is evident from the language used in discussing 
the constitutional rights of these countries that any attempts to take away the right to vote in 
these countries will have a much higher hurdle to overcome than one would in India. In the US, 
one must meet strict scrutiny when dealing with a fundamental right by showing that the 
government has a compelling interest and that the means of achieving this is narrowly tailored. 175 
In Canada, the law must be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 176 In South 
Africa the law must be one of general application and reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. 177 These three standards are 
all much less deferential to the government and place a more onerous burden on the government 
to justify infringing the right. 
Based upon the review the case law from India and by comparison with the US, Canada 
and South Africa, the answer to the question of which method of providing rights is more 
protective of the rights given and thus more desirable is that a constitution is preferable due to its 
ability to provide greater protection. Constitutions are almost always more protective because 
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they demand a more stringent standard of review to legal challenges and they are harder to 
change than statutory rights. What then is the preferred structure of a constitution? Positive, 
which is the structure of the constitutions of Canada and South Africa, or negative as is the case 
in the US. This is discussed below. 
d. Positive or Negative Rights? 
Once it has been determined that a constitution is the preferred method of conferring 
rights to a country's citizenry, the next question is what constitutional structure should the 
country choose? The two most commonly adhered to forms are positive and negative. As 
previously mentioned, it is fairly easy to conclude that constitutions are more protective of rights 
than statutory laws. But which is more protective of rights when it comes to competing 
constitutional structures? The negative model, as exemplified by the US Constitution, can be 
protective but suffers from one main flaw - the nature of the negative model only says what 
government cannot do which inherently implies that some things can be done by the government 
to the citizens' rights. By contrast, the positive model, as exemplified by Canada and South 
Africa starts from the premise that the right is absolute. 
Although standards of review are present in the Canadian and South African 
constitutions, it is much harder to take away constitutional rights in these countries because they 
are clearly articulated in an affirmative way. All that is necessary in these countries is the 
existence of the right in the constitution and the full force of constitutional protection is in place. 
By contrast, under the US negative model, a whole series of questions will be asked before it is 
determined what standard of review will be applied, i.e. rational basis, intermediate, or strict 
scrutiny. Questions such as is there a suspect class, is this a fundamental right and what is the 
purpose of the law? Furthermore, one of the flaws in the ad hoc creation of standards of review 
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in the US is that the US Supreme Court has at times completely sidestepped any standard of 
review as occurred in Richardson. This is much more difficult to do under the positive rights 
model, especially when there is only one standard of review clearly articulated in the constitution 
itself. 
If one accepts that certain rights, such as the right to vote, should receive greater 
protections from abridgment, then the best choice for accomplishing this goal is by choosing a 
positive rights constitutional structure either as a whole or for the specific ri ghts deemed most 
fundamental by the country. This takes much of the "guesswork" out of the review of the laws at 
issue and avoids questions such as what the drafters intended and also the prob lems of 
disagreement on what privileges the right articulated actually provides . Put s imply, te lling 
someone what they have is much easier than telling someone only what cannot be done to them. 
e. Specific or Generalized Language? 
Since there is ample evidence in place to supp01t the conclusion that constitutions should 
be preferred over statutory rights and that positive constitutional structures should be preferred 
over negative ones at least regarding the right to vote, the final question to be asked is whether 
the rights identified in the constitution should be articulated by very clear and specific language 
or more general language allowing for judicial flexibility when interpreting the right. 
When it comes to the language chosen to articu late a voting right, clear specific language 
is the better alternative. There is one caveat to thi s. If clear specific language is chosen, the 
draftees of the constitution must have the foresight to draft the re levant rights in a manner that 
does not later yearn for more. Assuming this can be done, a very clear and specific art iculation 
of a particular right in a constitution can protect against na rrow interpretational approaches to 
lessening a right. Vague and general language is a swinging door. This design can al low a court 
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to interpret a law broadly and liberally which can make up for any inadequacies in the drafting of 
the constitution. This same feature can also result in courts interpreting language very narrowly 
which could result in the exact same language lessening a citizen's right. A country should not 
gamble with generalized language because this could lead to courts justifying restrictions of 
rights by judicial interpretation. 
Regardless of the overall constitutional structure (positive, negative, specific language 
versus general) chosen by a country, the right to vote in any democracy should receive 
disproportionate treatment in how the right is expressed and the process by which potential 
limitations on the right are analyzed by the country's highest court. The right should receive the 
greatest protections that a Constitution can provide. This is not to say that the right to vote 
should be absolute. However, when restricting such a paramount right, the one who seeks to 
take it away should have a heavy task in front of them. Such an approach is the only approach 
that is consistent with countries who proclaim the superior nature of democracy and voting. 
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